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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
DARNELL L. GARCIA,
Defendant-Respondent.

Case No.
12994

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal brought by the plaintiff-appellant,
State of Utah, from an order arresting the judgment, dismissing the case, and exonerating the respondent.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The respondent, Darnell LeRoy Garcia, was convicted
of Burglary in the Second Degree on May 18, 1972, before
Judge Calvin Gould in the District Court of Weber
County, State of Utah. On May 26, 1972, Honorable
Calvin Gould arrested the judgment and dismissed the
case because he believed the respondent was denied equal
protection of the laws.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment which
arrested respondent's conviction, and also seeks an order
reinstating the Court's judgment of May 18, 1972, which
found respondent guilty of Burglary in the Second Degree.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the night of March 10, 1972, Edna Hardy, the
Assistant Director of the Bertha Eccles Art Center, was
awakened by loud talking (T. 9). Mrs. Hardy lives in
the Art Center and is responsible for the house and
grounds (T. 5). She went to her window and observed
two men who were ducking from automobile lights (T.
9) . When she heard the office window break, she telephoned the police (T. 10). When the police cars arrived,
Mrs. Hardy saw one figure jump from the office window
(T. 10, 16). While the officers did not actually see anyone
inside the building, there was sufficient evidence to show
that someone had been inside (T. 61-62). Although Mrs.
Hardy could not identify which defendant had leaped
through the window (T. 16), the respondent told Marlin
Balls, an Ogden City police officer, that he had been in
the building and that there had been no one else inside
except himself (T. 47).
When Officer Watts of the Ogden City Police Department drove up, he saw the co-defendant Randall Robert Houle walking approximately ten feet from the build-
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ing (T. 37). Mr. Houle was apprehended immediately
(T. 37), and arrested by Officer Watts (T. 32).
After apprehending Mr. Houle, Officer Watts told
Officer David M. White that there was someone else in
the building (T. 39). Officer Watts then heard glass
break, and observed Officer White hurrying towards that
area (T. 39). Officer White also heard the glass break,
and he observed a man leap from the building, hit the
ground, and then run north towards Officer Balls (T.
24). Officer Balls saw the respondent running towards
him, and commanded him to stop (T. 42). Officer Balls
apprehended the respondent and placed him in custody
(T. 43-44). Respondent told Officer Balls that he had
"just screwed up a little bit," and that he was "high" (T.
4A) . "He said when you are high, man, you will steal
anything" (T. 44). Respondent testified that he had told
the officer that he cut his leg while going through the
window (T. 59).
The co-defendants were charged with Second Degree
Burglary (R. 1) . However, Houle's charge was dropped
and he was allowed to plead guilty to the misdemeanor
of Trespass (R. 6). The respondent was not afforded the
opportunity to enter a plea to a lesser charge (T. 3).
Apparently, there were two main reasons why the charge
was reduced to one co-defendant and not the other: 1)
There was different evidence concerning each of the defendants at the Preliminary Hearing (T. 3). 2) There
was a strong difference in previous criminal records concerning the two defendants, and there were other circum-
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stances which lent themselves 'wwards reducing one charge
and not the other (T. 66). The Respondent had been
previously convicted of burglary, while Houle did not have
a serious prior record (T. 59-60, 66).
The Judge, Honorable Calvin Gould, sitting without
a jury, found the respondent guilty of Burglary in the
Second Degree (T. 62). Later, the court arrested respondent's conviction under the doctrine that he had
been denied equal protection by the "executive branch"
which includes the District Attorney's office (T. 72). The
court believed that the men were similarly situated (T.
72), and decleared that defendants who are similarly
situated must be afforded equal plea opportunities (T.
65).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN ARRESTING RESPONDENT'S CONVICTION BECAUSE OF
AN ALLEGED DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION.
There is heavy case authority maintaining the position that respondent's conviction for Second Degree Burglary should not have been arrested. In the alternative,
appellant could not find a single authority which would
suggest an arrest of respondent's conviction.
The leading case of Newman v. United States, 382
F. 2d 479 (D. C. Cir. 1967), is very similar to the instant
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case. In Newman, the appellant's co-defendant was allowed to plead guilty to misdemeanor of petty larceny,
a lesser included offense under the indictment, while the
United States attorney refused to grant the same plea
for the appellant. The court held that there was no denial
of appellant's constitutional rights. Newman held that
the prosecutor is an officer of the executive department
and he may exercise his discretion as to whether or not
there shall be prosecution in a particular case. The opinion stated that courts are not to interfere with the prosecutor's discretion:
. . . the
exercise
neys of
criminal

courts are not to interfere with the free
of the discretionary power of the attorthe United States in their control over
prosecutions. Id. at 481.

There is a presumption that the prosecutor will exercise
his powers consistent with his oaths. Id. at 482. "It is
not the function of the judiciary to review the exercise
of the executive discretion . . ." Id. S'ee also United
States v. Taylor, 448 F. 2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1971). " ... no
court has any jurisdiction to inquire into or review his
decision." Newman, supra, at 482. The executive department "has abundant supervisory and disciplinary powers
- including summary dismissal - to deal with misconduct of their subordinates." Id. "A case is not to be summarily dismissed because the court disagrees with some
policy of the District Attorney's office." Id. at 481. In
Newman, the arguments of defense were the same as the
instant case (See Id. at 480), but the court held that the
conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is
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not in itself a federal constitutional violation. Id. Rather,
the court stated the following:
Myriad factors can enter into the prosecutor's decision. Two persons may have committed what
is precisely the same legal offense but the prosecutor is not compelled by law, duty or tradition to
treat them the same as to charges. On the contrary, he is expected to exercise discretion and
common sense to the end that if, for example, one
is a young first offender and the other older, with
a criminal record, or one played a lesser and the
other a dominant role, one the instigator and the
other a follower, the prosecutor can and should
take such factors into account; Id. at 481-482.
(Emphasis added.)
The decisions in the Newman opinion are backed
with strong support. Hutcherson v. United States, 345
F. 2d 964 (D. C. Cir. 1965), stated that the choice of
applicable statutes for indictment and prosecution should
be made by the prosecutor, and the defendant has no constitutional rights in the election. The prosecutor has complete control over the proceedings and may exercise his
discretion. Even if there has been an indictment, a district attorney has broad powers in dismissing or entering
nolle prosequi in a criminal case. See State v. Hensley,
53 N. M. 308, 207 P. 2d 529 (1949).
In State v. Andrews, 165 N. W. 2d 528 (Minn. 1969),
the court held that a prosecutor is entitled to the presumption that he has acted fairly in the discharge of his
official functions. A difference in charges made against
co-defendants does not give rise to a presumption of dis-
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crimination. Id. The defendant has the burden of proof
in an alleged denial of equal protection and he must show
i..ntentional and purposeful discrimination. Id. The court
stated:
A record that is at best obscure as to the nature
of the prosecutor's decision and that is wholly
silent as to the considerations which motivated
such decision falls far short of meeting the challenger's burden of proof. Id. at 533-534.
In People v. Winters, 342 P. 2d 538 (Cal. App. 1959),
there was a presumption of the prosecutor's fairness and
the burden of proof was upon the defendant; the court
then declared that it was an abuse of discretion for a
municipal judge, without a hearing, to hold that there
had been a deliberate or intentional unequal enforcement
of the laws, and that the judge could be disqualified at
the insistence of the plaintiff or the defendant. Id.

Winters, stated that the basic question in criminal prosecution is whether the defendant is guilty, not
whether there are other lawbreakers who have escaped
detection and punishment. The court held that the following principle is clearly and properly established:
It is not a denial of equal protection that one
guilty person is prosecuted while others equally
guilty are not. Id. at 545.
See also State v. Reichenberger, 182 N. W. 2d 692 (Minn.
1970). Equal Protection does not mean equal enforcement
of the law. It does not mean that "if some guilty persons
escape, others who are apprehended should not be prose-
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cuted." lVinters, supra. at 544. In Winters, the court
noted that the remedy for unequal enforcement of the
law "does not lie in the exoneration of the guilty at the
expense of society." Id. A Southern California Law Review article gives good coverage of the subject. Prosecutorial Discretion in the Initiation of Criminal Complaints,
42 S. Cal. L. Rev. 519 (1969), declares that it is unattainable to have a standard which treats all people the same.
Id. at 541. It further states that:
The equal protection clause does not dictate that
failure to prosecute certain individuals should nullify valid criminal laws and allow admitted violators to avoid prosecution. Id. at 538-539.
Miss Rita James, appointed amicus curie, pointed out
that by not fully prosecuting an offender of the laws, it
is actually the people who suffer; that when the co-defendant pleads to a lesser offense, the people bear the burden
and the respondent is not any worse off (T. 70).
In Sanders v. Waters, 199 F. 2d 317 (10th Cir. 1952),
the District Court for Oklahoma found no merit to the
contention that equal protection is violated because some
defendants with prior convictions were prosecuted under
the habitual criminal statute and some were not. The
court stated:
The fact that indictments or informations do not
always charge a violation of the habitual criminal
statute where the accused has had prior felony
convictions, does not affect the validity of the
statute. Id. at 318.
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In State v. Hicks, 325 P. 2d 794 (Or. 1958), the court
found that there had been a laxity in the enforcement of
the law, but the courts held that mere laxity is not and
cannot be held to be a denial of equal protection of the
law. A violation of equal protection would require the
following:
... yet, if it is applied and administered by public
authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand,
so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denisJ of eq_ual
justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution. Id. at 803. (Emphasis added.)
Before equal protection is denied by discrimination, there
must be proof of an intentional or purposeful discrimination. State v. Anderson, 159 N. W. 2d 892 (Minn. 1968);
See also Prosecutorial Discretion in the Initiation of Criminal Complaints, supra. There must be a showing of deliberate discrimination between persons in similar circumstances based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race,
religion, or other arbitrary classification. United States
v. Alarik, 439 F. 2d 1329 (8th Cir. 1971), at 1350-1351.
Miss J arnes, amicus curie, distinguished Oyler v.
Boles, 368 U. S. 448, 82 S. Ct. 501, 7 L. Ed. 2d 446 (1962),
from the present case. She said, "it would seem that we
do not have exactly the same situation we have here" (T.
67). She further stated: "I don't think Oyler comes right
out and tells us this is tantamount to a denial of equal
protection" (T. 67). Oyler, supra, allows a conscious exercise of selectivity in enforcement. This selective en-
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forcement is permissible unless it is based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification. Id. at 453.
In State v. Anderson, supra, there were 59 charges
made under the city ordinance while only 7 were prosecuted under state law. The court held that there is no
discrimination until there is proof that the facts and circumstances in all the cases were similar, and that there
is no reasonable ground for the exercise of selectivity. The
court mentioned that the reasonable grounds for greater
leniency might exist because of a first offense, a person's
background, or some other reason. Id. at 894. For an
example of leniency due to circumstances see Reichenberger, supra at 696. State v. Gamelgard, 177 N. W. 2d
404 (Minn. 1970), discusses acceptable reasons for leniency and the use of prosecutor's discretion:
The court recognized that there are numerous and
various factors which enter into the determination
of culpability and sentence, such as degree of culpability, prior record, and degree of cooperation
with the prosecutor and correctional authorities.
Id. at 407. (Emphasis added.)
The increasing of authorized punishment of prior offenders is constitutional. See Epperson v. United States, 371
F. 2d 956 (D. C. Cir. 1967). To facilitate the heavier
punishment of a prior offender, the courts are eager to
help the prosecution in his discretion:
The courts will not skimp in affording the prosecution an opportunity to obtain and appraise the
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prior record of the accused in order to determine
whether to seek a felony conviction. Id. at 958.
Sufficient evidence is an important factor influencing
the prosecutor's discretion to prosecute. If it is the prosecutor's opinion that the law or evidence does not justify
the prosecution of a case, he may refuse to institute action.
See Perry v. State, 181 P. 2d 280 (Old. 1947).
In October of 1971, United States v. Taylor, 448 F. 2d
1280 (4th Cir. 1971), found no abuse of the prosecutor's
discretion, nor violations of equal protection when a confederate who had assisted in a get-away and supplied a
gun, was charged with a misdemeanor while the appellant
was convicted of a felony and was serving his 15 year
sentence.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico in State v.
Verdugo, 79 N. M. 765, 449 P. 2d 781 (N. M. 1969), found
no violation of a conspirator's rights even though the conspirator was serving his sentence for conspiracy, while an
entry of nolle prosequi was entered as to the other alleged
conspirators. While claiming that there was no merit to
the appellant's argument, the court stated:
Certainly it takes two or more to effect a conspiracy, State v. Deaton, 74 N. M. 87, 390 P. 2d 966
(1964), but conviction of all conspirators, or even
more than one, is not required. Ordinarily, the
entry of a nolle prosequi as to other alleged conspirators does not vitiate the conviction of a remaining defendant charged with conspiracy with
them. Id. at 782.
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In the instant case, the respondent had a prior felony
conviction while his co-defendant had no serious prior
record. The prosecutor had a problem with the evidence
concerning the co-defendant, and there were other circumstances which led the prosecutor to accept the codefendant's plea to a lesser charge (T. 3, 77). The codefendant was allowed to plead to a lesser charge through
well founded reasons based upon prosecutorial discretion
(T. 3, 66). Even after the attack by the defense, the
state's attorney stated: "However, I have no intentions
of maldng a Motion to reduce or dismiss the charges after
discussing the case" (T. 67). After discussing the case
with the prosecutor, the state's attorney, Mr. Neeley,
believed that the two defendants were not similarly situated, and that the prosecutor's actions were most appropriate (T. 69-70). The defense has failed in meeting the
burden of proof and in overcoming the presumption of
the prosecutor's fairness. The court below erred in not
respecting the prosecutor's properly exercised discretion.
CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, the respondent's
arrested conviction should be reinstated. The prosecution
properly exercised its discretion in charging the co-defendants with different crimes. The burden of proof is upon
respondent to show discrimination, and the respondent
has failed to meet his burden of proof. The lower court
erred in arresting the judgment and exonerating the respondent. Firstly, because it is not the function of judi-
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ciary to review the exercise of the executive branch. And
secondly, because the prosecutor did not abuse his discretion. The order of the lower court must be reversed, with
directions to reinstate the judgment convicting respondent with Burglary in the Second Degree.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
WILLIAM T. EVANS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellant

